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ZIRAILI NA ZIRANI,  
A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
LOU AKUSUA DE GIULI 
 
The novel Ziraili na Zirani, by W. Mkufya, is characterised by the constant recurrence of themes 
featuring in theodicy, the philosophical ‘vindication of divine goodness and providence in view of 
the existence of evil’ (Oxford dictionaries online). The themes which emerge from the characters’ 
conversations throughout the novel provide a constant confrontation of arguments to support or re-
fute the existence of God. This paper aims to analyse the novel from a philosophical perspective, 
in order to clarify and emphasise the connection between the ideas and words employed by the 
characters, and the theories of Western philosophers such as St. Anselm, Thomas Aquinas and 
Leibnitz. The focus on these particular philosophical aspects contributes to a deeper understanding 
of the novel as a whole. 
Introduction 
Ziraili na Zirani1, by W. Mkufya, narrates the adventures of the soul of Fikirini Zirani after 
his death. The themes presented through the characters’ conversations, both explicitly and 
implicitly, provide a constant confrontation of philosophical arguments to support or negate 
the existence of God. In particular, the peculiarity of the novel lies in the constant recurrence 
of themes featuring in theodicy, the philosophical ‘vindication of divine goodness and provi-
dence in view of the existence of evil’ (Oxford online dictionaries). 
 This paper aims to analyse the novel from a philosophical perspective, by providing the 
theoretical background of theodicy.2 It seeks to clarify and emphasise the connection between 
the ideas and words employed by the characters, and the well known theories of philosophers 
such as Saint Anselm, Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz. 
 The paper will begin with a short summary of the plot, illustrating the author’s writing 
style, followed by an analysis of philosophical theories such as ‘the problem of evil’, the ex-
istence of free will, and the necessity of a ‘first unmoved mover’, and their employment in the 
novel. The concluding section will state that given the strength of the arguments provided 
what emerges is a characterisation of an ‘imperfect’ God, whose existence is, however, con-
firmed in the climax of the story.  
                                                 
1 This paper presents an analysis based on the novel (Mkufya 1999) and on the author’s own English version 
Pilgrims from Hell (2006). References throughout the paper are made to either text. Quotes in Swahili are pre-
sented alongside the corresponding text in the English version. 
2 References made throughout the novel are predominantly linked to Western philosophical tradition. The choice 
of characters, key theoretical concepts, and the iterative patterns of the discussion mirror the life and thinking 
of great Western scholars such as Voltaire, Descartes, Schopenhauer or Marx. For this reason, I approach the 
analysis through the lenses of Western philosophy.  
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Plot and literary features 
Following death, the soul of Fikirini Zirani, whose name, an “imperative in the plural, mean-
ing ‘think and reject’” (Rettová 2007:224), reflects his atheist position, escapes and tempo-
rarily avoids the customary divine judgement. Lucifer captures and takes him to a cavern in-
habited by devils where he is instructed on ‘satanic virtues’, and trained to take part in a rebel-
lion to ‘bring down the heavenly kingdom’ (mafunzo ya kuzipinga mbigu) (Mkufya 2006: 56, 
1999: 37). Once left the cave, Zirani reaches Hell, and immediately joins the camp of atheist 
souls, becoming a leader in the organisation of the fight against Heaven. The battle itself, re-
sulting in the destruction of the world, is very short, and occurs only at the end of the novel; 
the bulk of the narration focuses instead on its preparation. What is central is most important-
ly the fight against the ideas of Heaven and God.  
 The fight involves three groups of characters: devils, souls of Hell and angels, each associ-
ated with a distinct school of thought. The angels promulgate the notion of an almighty God; 
the devils, although sure of His existence, constantly act against God, while the souls of Hell 
totally reject His existence. 
 The divergence of ideas emerges through the division between the locations of the groups: 
only the devils and atheists are found together from time to time, while the angels live a sepa-
rate existence. This reflects their thoughts: devils and atheists agree in their fight against 
Heaven, and are open to collaboration. All groups are eventually found together in the battle, 
which may be compared to the final act of a long-lasting debate: it is only after this encounter 
that a solution to the discussion on the existence of God arises.  
 The lexical field chosen to describe the residence of the groups is a literary feature which 
further emphasises their disparity of thought. The depiction of the devils’ cavern and of Heav-
en, for instance, renders explicit the contrast between its inhabitants. 
 Being an open, ‘empty’ space, Heaven and its creatures are described through terms such 
as utamu ‘sweetness’, wororo ‘tenderness’ and furaha ‘happiness’. Its silence and tranquillity 
(kimya), are reflected in the need to ‘mumble’, opposed to the mluzi ‘whistle’ performed by 
Lucifer to be granted entrance in the cavern. The cavern is in fact ‘chaotic’, ‘polluted’, with 
‘pungent air’ and smoke. Its architecture differs as well: unlike Heaven, infinitely extending 
vertically, it has a roof, painted in black, and closed spaces, such as a ‘snaking’ corridor. Its 
colours, contrasting with an ‘immaculate’ Heaven full of ‘violet light’ (nuru ya zambarau), 
are mostly grey and black (Mkufya 1999: 30-31, 44, 2006: 39, 53-54).  
The ontological argument: a benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent God  
Anselm (1033-1109) was an Italian/French Benedictine monk, whose work has brought fun-
damental contributions to theology. Of particular interest is the Proslogium (Anselm 1903), a 
prayer in which Anselm illustrates the features of the Christian God, and gives an ontological 
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proof of His existence.3
 God is nothing but that ‘being than which nothing greater can be con-
ceived’ (Anselm 1903: ch. 2). It is in the very fact that the concept of such being is under-
standable by all, even by ‘the fool’, that Anselm’s proof of His existence lies: as to exist is 
better than not to (ibid.: ch. 3), the greatest entity, necessarily an expression of the ‘absolute 
good’, must be real. Consequently, were He not to exist, He would not meet the standards of a 
‘being than which nothing greater could be conceived’ (ibid.: ch. 3). A similar standpoint is 
taken by René Descartes (1596-1650), a French philosopher, mathematician and writer, 
known as the ‘Father of modern philosophy’, given his influence on the development of 
Western philosophical discourse. It is in his Meditations that he concludes that the very nature 
of God entails His existence (Descartes 1901). God is hence characterised as omnipotent, om-
niscient and benevolent: he who is powerful is greater than the powerless; similarly to be wise 
and good is greater than to be ignorant and bad (Anselm 1903: ch.7).  
 The qualities which, according to this argument, legitimately describe God, coincide with 
the characteristics of the God presented in the novel; this understanding of God will therefore 
be used throughout the discussion as the model against which to weigh the critiques presented 
by the characters concerning His existence and perfection.  
 Such God, as earlier mentioned, is not accepted by most souls in Hell: the slogan of the 
camp itself,  
kambi ya roho za binadamu walioamini itikadi ya udhahiri wa vitu, hali, jinsia, na 
maumbo kwa sifa zao zionekanazo au kutambulika kwa hisia na vipimo vya 
binadamu na sio kwa sifa za imani au dhana peke yake,  
Camp for souls of humans who believe in the ideology of the manifestation of 
things, essences, forms and states can be detected by human senses or their in-
struments and not through belief or any form of idealism (Mkufya 1999:68, 
2006:87),  
shows a critique of the truthfulness of Anselm’s claim. Recall that the claim sets existence as 
greater than non-existence. Should not material manifestation, on the same lines, be regarded 
as greater than the mere spiritual one? This implies the necessity for God to be tangible, if He 
were to be the greatest conceivable.  
 The next section will focus on the additional critiques of Anselm’s proof which may be de-
tected in the novel.  
The ‘problem of evil’ and free will: Are God and evil incompatible, or does their 
coexistence reflect ‘the best of all possible worlds’? 
The philosophical discourse known as the ‘problem of evil’ appears to lie behind the major 
critiques of Anselm’s thesis presented throughout the story. This discourse refutes Anselm’s 
almighty God by drawing attention to the existence of evil in the world. Anselm’s God, ex-
                                                 
3 Ontology is that branch of metaphysics which analyses being and existence, and focuses on the nature of enti-
ties (adapted from Oxford online dictionaries). 
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pected ‘not [to] be partial’, and to guarantee ‘concern, guidance and protection’, equally to all 
tribes and races of mankind (Mkufya 2006: 92, 1999: 73), does not appear in reality, and, on 
the other hand, causes ‘all pious and evil people [...] to suffer the same punishment’ (Mkufya 
2006: 92, 1999: 74).  
‘Free will’ 
The term indicates the belief that humans act independently from divine influence, and should 
therefore be held responsible for their own actions.4 It is a critically relevant and complex 
component of theodicy. Its complexity is a result of divergent assessments provided by ana-
lysers on its effects: the concept is employed both by believers and atheists to present their 
position.5 The range of standpoints on the topic is well depicted in the novel, throughout 
which several characters present distinct views.  
 Although some argue for the reality of free will as a consequence of the non-existence of a 
higher being, resulting in the lack of external divine influence on individual decisions, its rele-
vance to theodicy lies in its use as a proof to support the non-existence of God. The issue is 
strictly connected to the ‘problem of evil’ outlined earlier, and to God’s non-intervention. 
Free will: an argument rejecting an almighty God 
One possible implication of the acceptance of free will as a reality is the lack of responsibility 
on God’s side in the creation of evil. Evil in the world uniquely depends on human choice, 
and not on a malevolent God. However, even holding solely men responsible for evil leads to 
the refutation of His almightiness. If free will is a consequence of God’s inability to affect the 
course of nature, He does not meet the criteria of omnipotence. If God, on the other hand, de-
liberately chooses to allow men to harm one another without intervening, and to perform as a 
mere observer, He should be considered malevolent: He is not using his total power to prevent 
suffering which could be avoided. This incompatibility, to which reference is made through-
out the novel, is clearly stated in multiple occasions by the soul of Voltaire, a character of the 
novel who represents the French prominent philosopher of the Enlightenment Voltaire (1694-
1778). It is through the words of the Greek philosopher Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) that he ex-
plains his own standpoint:  
Ama Mungu ana uwezo wa kuzuia uovu na mateso ya dunia lakini hataki, hivyo 
ana nia mbaya kwa wanadamu; au duniani upo uovu, mateso na uonevu, lakini 
Mungu hawezi kuuzuia, hivyo si muweza wa yote  
                                                 
4 Adapted from Oxford online dictionaries 
5 All characters in the novel seem to accept the existence of free will, when opposed to God’s influence. The idea 
that free will does not exist, will not therefore be treated in this paper. It should however be noted that the 
souls in the camp do not believe in total individual responsibility, but rather partly justify negative behaviours 
as a necessary reaction to an oppressive society: [s]asa huoni kwamba kiini cha makosa yako sio wewe? [...] 
kiini chake ni ile hali iliyosababisha tofauti la pato la fedha baina ya wewe na hao matajiri [“but don’t you 
see that the root of your sins was not yourself? [...]don’t you see that all [your sins were] caused by the differ-
ence of wealth between the rich and the poor”] (Mkufya1999: 93, 2006: 113) 
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There is evil in the world. Either God can prevent it and he doesn’t, so he is ma-
levolent; or God cannot prevent it, so he is not omnipotent (Mkufya 1999: 74, 
2006: 92).  
Free will: the very proof of the existence of a perfect God 
This argument, supported by the angels, gives a different perspective on the relation between 
God’s almightiness and human responsibility. In this framework God is seen as omnipotent 
precisely because He is able to create beings who are free to reason, and even free to refute 
His existence and authority: “God allows humans to make mistakes and to disobey him” 
(Mkufya 2006: 47, 1999: 39). To better clarify the thesis parallels may be drawn with the 
qualities of a toy-maker. The latter will be considered more skilful if capable of constructing 
toys which are able to move independently, rather than mere puppets subject to his constant 
control. God’s creation is described by Lucifer as “self-willed intelligent toys” (Mkufya 1999: 
74, 2006: 76).  
Just a possibility, not ‘the best of all possible worlds’6 
The angels’ conversations in the epilogue reveal that what has ended is, in fact, a world: many 
others have existed before, and a better one will probably now be created. An opposing posi-
tion has been argued by the German mathematician and philosopher Gottfried (von) Leibniz 
(1646-1716) who focuses instead on an a priori assessment of the world, based on the pre-
sumption of God’s perfection.7 Because He is perfect, and because the world is His own act, 
such creation must be perfect8 (Leibniz 1908: 260). Leibniz moreover justifies the existence 
of evil in the world as a necessary incentive for the rise of the good: the positive quality of 
courage, for instance, may exist uniquely in the presence of evil to be fought. The world we 
know is depicted as the best balance between good and evil. In the novel, on the other hand, 
the devils “managed to turn man’s free will against God” (Rettová 2007: 233), and only a mi-
nority of three million four hundred thousand five hundred and thirty one individuals lived 
according to God’s teachings (Mkufya 1999: 237). 
The first unmoved mover 
An additional philosophical theory which suggests the existence of God, known as the cosmo-
logical or causal argument, arises through Zirani’s dream. The theory was originally devel-
oped by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) in his Metaphysics (Aristotle 1953), 
to suggest the necessity of a ‘first unmoved mover’ to justify motion in the world. It was later 
embraced by Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)9, an Italian Dominican priest, who equating the 
                                                 
6 Leibniz 2005: ch.168. 
7 In God, “perfection is absolutely infinite” (Leibniz 1908: 259). 
8 Following from God’s perfection is the perfection of His acts: “my opinion is that God does nothing for which 
he does not deserve to be glorified” (Leibniz 1908: 7). 
9 The idea is developed in part I of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica. 
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‘first mover’ to God proved His existence. The theory presumes that things in the world are in 
constant motion, and that kinetic energy is continuously transferred. This energy transfer is 
the phenomenon which allows still bodies to be set in motion. If we are to trace the chain of 
cause and effect of motion, we must eventually reach the point of origin. It is now that the ex-
istence of a first mover must be acknowledged: being the first one, and the source of any sub-
sequent motion, the first mover is not himself the result of a previous motion, but motion it-
self, pure energy. The man appearing in Zirani’s dream references the argument, discussing 
the idea of a higher being attributing tasks to each entity, coordinating the universe, and creat-
ing all motion (Mkufya 2006: 193). This being, unlike Aquinas’ God, is beyond human un-
derstanding. The old man’s speech has put forward many questions, creating a difficult posi-
tion for Zirani: the points presented become a “challenge to him and his participation in the 
goals of the materialist camp” (ibid.: 193). 
The imperfect existence of God 
Although the author himself strongly stresses the atheist feature of the novel,10 I do not be-
lieve the novel depicts atheism as a valid philosophy. Reason for this is its unexpected ending. 
The finale of the battle reveals in fact the existence of a God, and the collaboration and inter-
dependence between devils and angels. Although the end of the world has destroyed the earth 
and humankind, it has left all heavenly creatures untouched. What the novel seems to suggest 
is rather a refusal of atheist logical discourses and the confirmation that the existence of a 
higher being is beyond, and independent from, its rational understanding, a view earlier intro-
duced through Zirani’s dream. It should be noted, however, that the characterisation of God, 
both throughout the novel and in its climax, suggests His imperfection.  
 The angels’ conversation, earlier referenced while discussing Leibniz’ argument, probably 
provides, among all theories featuring in the novel, the strongest reason to negate the perfect 
character of God. By explaining how the last world created by God was not in fact the best 
among existing possibilities, the angels judge the outcome of His action ‘imperfect’. This, by 
consequence, negates the perfection of His very nature: “[some] think that God could have 
done better” (Leibniz 2005: ch. 168).  This is an opinion which “[derogates] from God’s su-
preme perfection” (ibid.: ch. 168). 
Conclusion 
The author’s choice to treat the central theme of religion from a rational angle has given phi-
losophy a fundamental role in the novel Ziraili na Zirani. Reference to philosophical theories 
has in fact been treated by the author as one of the very tools for the development of the story: 
the individuality of the main characters, for example, owes much to their distinct philosophi-
cal approaches towards the events in the novel. Similarly, specific events themselves become 
                                                 
10 See Mkufya’s paper Atheism in the Swahili novel delivered at the Research Colloquia of the Departments of 
African Studies of the Universities of Leipzig and Bayreuth, respectively on the 17
th
 and 23
rd
 May 2006. 
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relevant as they provide new philosophical insights: Zirani’s dream, for instance, assumes im-
portance because it serves the function of introducing the reader to a new perspective.  
 This paper has attempted to clarify the main philosophical themes employed in the novel; 
by focusing on the recurrence of the issues of free will and of the ‘problem of evil’, it has ex-
plained the views and arguments on which the various characters base their acceptance or re-
fusal of the existence of God. The analysis attempts to assist the reader by bringing light to 
theories which may have not been explicitly or extensively illustrated by the author. The phil-
osophical component is in fact treated by Mkufya as a mere means to the development of the 
story. Despite its frequency in the novel, it would be erroneous to consider philosophy as any-
thing but a feature of the novel: it is rather on elements such as the storyline and the conflict 
between the characters that the novel is based. Ziraili na Zirani is a novel which allows room 
for philosophy, not one which was created by philosophy. The ultimate expression of this re-
ality is the finale, where the fictional nature of the text overweighs its philosophical character: 
given the dynamics of the confrontations of ideas throughout the story, a philosophical writ-
ing would have culminated in the victory of atheism, rather than in an unexpected ending. 
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